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1 Introduction: key issues in land and 
development patterns 
Land is central to the prospects for development in sub-Saharan Africa. While a growing 
proportion of the region’s population is living in urban settlements, the absolute rural 
population continues to grow. The vast majority depend on land-based livelihoods derived 
mostly from the region’s 80 million small-scale farms. Yet many have precarious livelihoods, in 
part due to the chronic under-investment by states and the private sector in African agriculture 
and associated infrastructure. Their hold on land, water and other crucial natural resources 
remains dependent on customary land rights that are often not adequately secured in law or 
practice; less than 10% of land in the region is privately titled. Into this context, rising 
pressures towards the commercialisation of land uses, and towards land leasing to (largely 
transnational) investors, are raising the stakes over who holds what rights to what land in 
Africa. Long-term competition over resource rights is likely to be aggravated as these multiple 
competing claims and interests in land confront one another, in a context of growing 
populations and climate change.  
This paper focuses on large-scale land acquisitions and the implications of these new trends for 
land-tenure rights in sub-Saharan Africa. It highlights trends in legal and policy approaches; 
describes and analyses new pressures on land and related natural resources; provides an 
analysis of drivers of resource scarcity and competing uses; summarises what is known about 
better and worse practices in partnerships between local communities and external investors; 
and concludes with recommendations for development partnerships. 
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2 Land tenure in Africa: theory and practice 
Secure land rights are a necessary precondition for economic development, but they are also 
insufficient (Toulmin and Quan, 2005). People need secure rights to land in order to invest in 
economic activities on it. Securing land tenure may involve a number of aspects: recognition of 
rights through statutory reforms; restoration of rights following dispossession or displacement; 
redistribution of rights in contexts of great inequality; and registration of rights in response to 
demand (Meinzen-Dick et al., 2008). Instrumentalist arguments for securing land rights are 
dominant among international development organisations, which emphasise the positive 
outcomes of tenure security for internal re-investment by smallholders, investment by external 
investors, social and political stability, and economic growth. Economic benefits of secure 
tenure have been shown to include the ability to reap direct-use benefits, incentives to invest, 
rising asset values, greater transfers to those better able and willing to use it (especially in the 
context of migration and limited access to inputs among landholders), the basis for promoting 
credit markets, more sustainable land use and management practices, and a reduction in 
conflict and displacement. There is evidence of a virtuous circle in some contexts, in which 
secure rights create incentives to invest, but also vice versa: people invest in land as a way to 
secure their rights to it (Platteau, 2000). These arguments tend to converge with those of 
human rights advocates who emphasise the need to recognise and secure land rights. 
If rights to land and property are clear and secure, this can help to boost economic 
growth, tackle inequality and reduce poverty. These rights enable people to invest in their 
future which means they are more likely to do so. They open up space for new housing 
and provide opportunities for investment and accumulation of wealth… They also 
encourage business which stimulates economic activity. Secure property rights provide a 
basis for tackling disputes over land and can reduce the risk of conflict. And, once people 
have security of place, this provides them with a platform to establish a broader spectrum 
of rights. (DFID, 2007) 
Controversies abound over land tenure and the most effective means by which to secure 
tenure rights. Should this be through private ownership or customary land rights or other 
forms of rights? How can reforms confront and overcome inequalities, rather than entrench 
them? Is there an accepted version of ‘custom’ or is it changing? In many countries, notions of 
‘living customary law’ have overtaken the notion of official and codified custom. In such a 
context, can some elements of custom be supported (such as locally legitimate practices and 
institutions) while rejecting other elements (such as gender discrimination and a central role 
for unaccountable or unelected leaders)? Who holds authority and accountability? How can 
costs be minimised and access to democratic and legitimate institutions promoted? 
2.1 Formalisation, individualisation and titling 
A hierarchy of land rights?  
Historically, many African (and other) governments have considered customary land-tenure 
systems to be ‘backward’ and a constraint on development, while private freehold has been 
considered a superior form of tenure. This modernist understanding has envisaged an 
evolution of tenure systems from one to the other, in response to individualisation of land uses 
and trends towards urbanisation. Platteau (1996) famously characterised and critiqued this 
dominant understanding of land tenure in Africa as being an ‘evolutionary theory of land 
rights’, which imposed Western presumptions of a historical teleology of tenure systems. ‘A 
central tenet of this theory is that under the joint impact of increasing population pressure and 
market integration, land rights spontaneously evolve towards rising individualization and that 
this evolution eventually leads rightsholders to press for the creation of duly formalized private 
property rights – a demand to which the state will have an incentive to respond’ (Platteau, 
1996: 29). His review of evidence from several countries concludes that ‘most of the beneficial 
effects usually ascribed to such a reform are grossly over-estimated and that, given its high 
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cost, it is generally advisable to look for more appropriate solutions that rely on existing 
informal mechanisms at community level’ (Platteau, 1996: 29). 
Private property? 
The privatisation of property in Africa has been given added impetus by the writing and 
advocacy of Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto, whose The Mystery of Capital argues that 
formalising property rights to land and houses can enable poor people to realise their ‘dead 
capital’ by using it as collateral or by renting or selling it (de Soto, 2000). These ideas 
influenced UNDP’s High-level Commission on the Legal Empowerment of the Poor (HCLEP) and 
informed donor practices, including for instance the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), 
established 2004, which has promoted privatisation of land to encourage foreign investment in 
several sub-Saharan states, advocating a market-based solution to food security. The de Soto 
paradigm has been extensively critiqued (e.g. Cousins et al., 2005). Experience in Africa 
demonstrates that it is a myth that ‘private property creates security and leads to investment’, 
according to Lund (2008).  
Failed titling in Kenya 
In Kenya, individual titling following the 1954 Swynnerton Plan created an indigenous landed 
class. However, as Okoth-Ogendo (1991) observed, it also created the corollary: a landless 
class. This, he shows, formed the basis for long-term conflicts in Kenya over land claims, 
taking the forms of litigation and violent ethnic clashes. The title system created a chronic 
disjuncture between the deeds registry and rights in practice. Problems with the model were 
that ‘those who gained were the rich, the powerful and the loyal’ (Sorrenson, 1967). 
Individualised rights undermined the claims of secondary rights-holders, particularly women. 
Some of the lessons from the Kenyan experience are that rights in customary systems are 
often non-exclusive and are overlapping and perform the function of a social safety net – 
aspects which are lost with the individualisation of titling (Okoth-Ogendo, 2002). 
Stalled privatisation in South Africa 
South Africa’s failed privatisation of communal land demonstrates the potential resistance from 
rural people such initiatives can elicit. Unlike the Kenyan approach, the South African approach 
was to propose titling of ‘tribal land’ at the community level. The Communal Land Rights Act 
11 of 2004 provided for the conversion of customary rights to freehold tenure. It proposed the 
creation of ‘traditional communities’ as legal entities under the administration of ‘traditional 
councils’. Rights currently vested in individuals and households under customary practices, 
then, would become subject to these councils comprised largely of unelected leaders. The 
danger of this approach is that it would be costly and slow to implement, leaving the vast 
majority of rural dwellers with insecure rights, pending this upgrade. Critics further questioned 
what purpose would be served by securing the outer boundary; what benefits this would bring 
to residents, and whether it would secure their rights, was unclear. In response to litigation by 
four affected communities claiming that the titling process would violate their rights to gender 
equality and to democratic governance, the Constitutional Court declared it unconstitutional in 
2010. Lessons from this stalled attempt at formalisation are to avoid massive top-down 
approaches and to focus on securing the rights of land rights-holders themselves, rather than 
the rights and powers of those administering land, such as traditional leaders. 
Titling of rural land, involving rigorous surveying, mapping and registration of individual land 
parcels, is neither feasible nor sustainable across most of sub-Saharan Africa. Although 
advanced geographic information systems (GIS) technology, funding and institutional support 
could enable substantial extension of national cadastres, the challenge is not merely a 
technical one, to be overcome through technical solutions. Rather, the challenge is to find 
systems for recording and registering rights, in a context where land is communally held and 
there are overlapping and ‘nested’ levels of rights, quite at odds with presumptions of 
exclusive rights. Even the World Bank’s policy research report, Land Policies for Growth and 
Poverty Reduction (Deininger, 2003) acknowledges that the Bank’s prior promotion of titling 
was a mistake, and advocates instead local-level registration of rights in low-cost and 
decentralised systems, noting with approval the ejido reforms of Mexico and the certification 
system used in Ethiopia (Deininger, 2003). 
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2.2 Recognition and registration of customary rights 
From the 1990s there has been growing recognition among African states as well as their 
development partners that resource tenure systems include not only state law but also local 
practices and customs – and that these too provide part of the architecture of tenure security, 
to be supported rather than superseded (EU, 2004; DFID, 2007; UNDP, 2008). Across many 
countries, reforms were enacted to recognise informal and unregistered land rights through 
law, rather than making recognition contingent on cumbersome processes of formalisation, 
especially at the central government level. Many reforms focused in the registration of right 
and individual or community level. 
Limits of titling – and alternatives 
Alternatives to titling may involve a land-administration system that is fast, cheap, efficient 
and reliable; recording of land rights based on locally agreed-upon boundaries; approximate 
and locally accessible systems of registering rights; and a system of more loosely defined 
boundaries based on what landholders themselves decide is workable and sustainable (Alden 
Wily, 2002). There are many variations in how such approaches may be conceptualised and 
implemented. Three examples from Southern Africa demonstrate some of the more innovative 
attempts to provide effective means of securing tenure at local level, and with legal 
recognition.  
Statutory protection in Mozambique 
Mozambique’s Land Law of 1997 aimed to respond to the challenge of insecure rights in a 
country where land had been nationalised and where displacement because of the civil war 
resulted in multiple conflicts. Added to these challenges were growing tensions between the 
rights of landholders and the interests of investors – and the need to mediate terms on which 
communities could transact but also defend their rights. The law maintained state ownership 
but provided statutory recognition of the unregistered rights of occupiers as constituting real 
property rights in law. This gave customary occupation legal force. The law enabled 
registration of community land (DUAT – from the Portuguese, or right of use and benefit of 
land), though this was not required, and prescribed community consultation by investors. Later 
regulations specified further the format and processes required for such consultations. The 
purpose, then, was first to secure rights, and second, to facilitate negotiation between local 
communities and outside investors – required in terms of the law. In practice, though, rising 
control by local chiefs (regulos) and re-centralisation of certain powers by government, have 
undermined implementation of the Act. Yet, ‘if used as intended by its architects, the Land Law 
can facilitate a process of local development in which a kind of equitable enclosure process 
linked to agreements between local people and investors can allow the locked up capital value 
of local land rights to be made available to local people’ (Tanner, 2005: 18). 
Decentralised certification in Madagascar 
In Madagascar, most property rights are unregistered and, under the unwieldy legal system 
inherited from the colonial era, registration of property rights through central government took 
24 steps, taking six years on average. This resulted in massive failure of the formal deeds 
registry to extend to the majority of citizens. Following a 2005 reform, a bottom-up process of 
formalisation was adopted, in which ‘petit papiers’ (small papers) were issued by local 
authorities (fokotany, or municipalities), providing recognition of existing rights. These ‘do-it-
yourself’ land certificates confirmed the identity of the title-holder, validation of the title by 
neighbours, the estimated surface area, the type of land occupancy and use, and the nature of 
the rights. The positive outcome of this reform is that, by 2009, 80% of all land titles and 
certificates had been issued in the three-year period since 2006 (Teyssier, 2010). Despite a 
substantial backlog, and imperfect and the weakness of the institutions responsible for 
administration of this new decentralised system, the reform is nevertheless bringing greater 
certainty to the area of land rights. 
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Local land boards in Botswana 
Botswana diverged from other approaches in the region by adopting a model of Land Boards to 
govern ‘tribal land’. Shortly after independence, this system was adopted, which removed 
traditional authorities (chiefs and indunas and other levels of the chieftaincy) from a role in 
land allocation, and established 12 main land boards and 38 subordinate land boards across 
the country. The boards issue use rights (not freehold) and maintain local land registers. Over 
time, practices have become fairly centralised, with the national minister appointing members 
of these boards, which now include state employees, elected representatives and traditional 
leaders (chiefs). The approach is innovative and has achieved some successes in establishing 
relatively transparent systems. However, challenges remain as there is a lack of checks and 
balances, and there have been some conflicts between bureaucrats, chiefs and elected leaders. 
Even so, the Botswana experience has been relatively effective in securing rights, and 
combining customary authority and state administration (White, 2010). 
2.3 Lessons from land-administration practices in sub-Saharan Africa 
Secure land rights do not depend on and indeed can be undermined by private titling, a 
process that has proved to be costly and slow, often resulting in out-of-date registrations that 
bear little resemblance to actual practices. One of the major challenges encountered in 
formalising customary land rights into private titled systems has been that the exclusivity of 
rights entrenches (gender and other) inequalities, effectively downgrading or ignoring the 
entitlements of secondary rights-holders. Securing land rights in order to promote investment 
by landholders and investors requires statutory protection and decentralised land 
administration. Locally legitimate customs and institutions can be supported to register rights, 
where a demand emerges, and to mediate conflicts between current occupiers and other 
claimants, for instance returnees in post-conflict situations.  
Positive lessons are to decentralise to local-level institutions (as in Madagascar); to secure 
occupation rights and require community consultation by investors, by law (as in 
Mozambique); and to include traditional authorities in democratic structures subject to state 
(as in Botswana). Negative lessons are to avoid massive titling programmes (as in Kenya), not 
to codify customary laws or titles and not to predefine membership of local administration 
bodies. 
Dealing with inequality remains a challenge. Securing land rights requires horizontal as well as 
vertical protection. As noted by UNDP (2008), ‘Formalizing land rights of legal claimants in 
settings marked by high degree of inequality is likely to formalize land claims by the non-poor, 
mostly elite, claimants’. This implies the need to secure the rights, particularly of vulnerable 
community members relative to other community members, but also to secure community 
rights (both substantive and procedural) vis-à-vis outsiders, including the local or national 
state and external investors. An alternative to bottom-up economic development is allowing 
external investors to obtain a land concession. Yet this underlines rather than removes the 
need for strong systems of land governance. 
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3 Debates about ‘land grabbing’ in sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Africa is at the centre of the new ‘global land rush’ – pejoratively termed ‘land grabbing’ or 
approvingly named ‘land-based foreign direct investment’ or, more neutrally, ‘large-scale land 
acquisitions’. Whatever the prevailing terminology and ideologies, there is now ample evidence 
that large swathes of African farmland are being allocated to investors, usually on long-term 
leases, at a rate not seen for decades – indeed, not since the colonial period. The fact that 
much of this land is being acquired to provide for the future food and fuel needs of foreign 
nations has, not surprisingly, led to allegations that a neo-colonial push by more wealthy and 
powerful nations is underway to annex the continent’s key natural resources. While no solid 
dataset tells us precisely the scale and distribution of the phenomenon, all the major studies 
conducted so far confirm that Africa is the global centre of land grabbing (Cotula et al., 2009; 
Oakland Institute, 2011; von Braun and Meinzen-Dick, 2009). The land is equivalent to all the 
farmland of France, Germany Italy and the UK combined.  
Concern has been raised about the scale of the phenomenon; very long duration of some of 
these agreements, which usually take the form of leases for an initial period of anywhere 
between 25 and 99 years, often renewable, suggesting that, in practice, alienation of land from 
local users is likely to be permanent; the dramatic changes in the environment that are often 
brought about, for instance deforestation and/or the replacement of multiple land uses with 
mono-cropping and changes in production and contribution to national food supplies, given the 
prevalence of production either of crops for export markets, or biofuels to meet demand 
elsewhere, notably in the EU. The sections below briefly outline the drivers of land deals in 
Africa; debates about under-use and displacement; speculative interests in land; whether what 
is underway is essentially a ‘water grab’; and whether there are direct trade-offs between ‘food 
versus fuel’. 
3.1 Drivers of land deals in Africa 
This dramatic rise in land acquisitions across Africa and elsewhere originates in three main 
drivers, which are reflected in the term ‘the triple-F crisis’: food, fuel and finance. The food 
price spikes of 2007–2008 showed just how vulnerable food-importing nations are to 
fluctuations in global commodity markets. These led many, including the Gulf States and 
several East Asian countries, to re-evaluate their strategies and secure land and water 
elsewhere, essentially turning to ‘offshore’ food production to supply their growing populations. 
This food crisis plunged an extra 100 million people globally into hunger, from which most 
have not recovered. This situation has set back by many years progress in achieving 
Millennium Development Goal 1: to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger.  
The rising and fluctuating oil prices in the period 2007–2009, and the realisation that we might 
have hit peak oil production, created powerful incentives for companies to acquire land for the 
production of ‘agrofuel’ or biofuel’ crops. Compounding the rush towards biofuels are policies 
like the EU target of 10% renewable content in its fuel stocks by 2020, which by itself 
constitutes a very substantial demand for renewables.  
The meltdown in international financial markets in late 2009 and the subsequent recession led 
investors to consider those markets volatile and risky. Many sought to invest in the more 
tangible asset of farmland, with the promise that rising demand for food and fuel would make 
this a secure investment in an increasingly unpredictable global system. While some may have 
long-term plans for these investments, others are clearly speculators, bargaining on short-
term gains. Private equity groups have established ‘farmland funds’, buying up portfolios of 
land in numerous countries and promising their clients annual returns of 30% over a five-year 
period. This figure is entirely unrelated to actual farm production, but is based on cheaply 
acquired land and a gamble on projected growth in demand for farmland, which will create 
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secondary markets for further transfers of these leases to other buyers – indeed, most of the 
contracts reviewed by Cotula et al. (2010) allowed onward transacting, a trend also noted by 
Hall (2011) in Southern Africa. 
Some analysts are now pointing to a fourth driver, the growth of carbon markets. Reducing 
Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) is an instrument that emphasises the 
strategic importance of controlling forested land – and most of Africa’s savannah can be 
counted as natural forest for these purposes. So as well as acquiring land to cultivate, 
investors are looking to acquire land in order not to cultivate it, in order to earn carbon credits. 
While these drivers are widely recognised and agreed upon, what is more disputed is the 
degree to which the re-valuation of farmland is driven by rising global resource scarcity. On 
the one hand, there is evidence of the declining ability of certain regions of the world to 
produce sufficient food and fuel for their own consumption needs (Godfray et al., 2010). On 
the other hand, a critique has emerged demonstrating the degree to which ‘resource scarcity’ 
is socially constructed, exists only in relation to specific desired ends, and, as a policy 
narrative, is used to justify actions that might undermine development agendas (McCarthy and 
Wolford, 2011; Mehta, 2010). In this sense, the ‘drivers’ of large-scale land acquisition should 
be understood as a partial explanation of the complex and context-specific factors that lead to 
the convergence of interests between foreign and domestic actors. 
3.2 Debates about under-use and displacement 
The re-valuation of land in Africa is based on widespread agreement among development 
agencies and investors that much of the arable land of the continent is un- or under-used, and 
that new investments and introduction of commercial agriculture (among other uses) will have 
zero opportunity cost. Prime among the exponents of a massive commercialisation initiative for 
the continent, on the basis that the land is available for this purpose, is the significant report 
entitled Awakening Africa’s Sleeping Giant (World Bank, 2009). 
Although not all of the African Guinea Savannah zone is suitable for agriculture, clearly 
it represents one of the world’s largest underused agricultural land reserves. There is no 
question that to feed the world, meet the growing demand for agricultural raw 
materials, and generate the feedstuffs needed for production of biofuels, a significant 
share of this zone will eventually have to be converted to agriculture, probably under 
more intensive land-use systems than are currently prevalent. (World Bank, 2009: 171) 
Land in Africa may, however, be less under-used than claimed, because of the importance of 
shifting cultivation and fallow systems that underpin dryland cropping (as well as fodder for 
livestock in mixed farming systems). FAO’s Global Agro-ecological Assessment, based on 
satellite imagery, produced estimates for sub-Saharan Africa of 807 million ha total cultivable 
land, of which 197–227 million ha (24%–28%) were under cultivation, as at 1995–1996 
(Cotula et al., 2009). These measurements do not capture practices of shifting cultivation and 
fallow systems, yet in sub-Saharan Africa, a ratio of five plots under fallow to every plot under 
cultivation is quite common. This implies that the range of the total ‘cultivated’ land could in 
reality be far higher. In addition, since 1996, there is likely to have been an increase in land 
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The World Bank hoped that commercialisation would focus on more marginal regions, bringing 
un- or under-used land into production and increasing overall output. However, research now 
suggests that investors are favouring areas with higher rainfall and proximity to urban centres 
and transport infrastructure – in other words, those areas already most prized by existing 
small-scale farmers. The report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 
Olivier de Schutter, showed this pattern, noting that the areas most sought after by investors 
are those with relatively fertile land, with good rainfall and with prospects of irrigation, close to 
transport infrastructure (de Schutter 2011). Indeed, the World Bank (2010) study, Rising 
Global Interest in Farmland, shows that weak laws enable investors to get access to resources 
and notes that – contrary to its own prescriptions of ‘good governance’ to attract investment – 
investor interest is inversely correlated with good governance. Typically these deals involve 
low prices, offering minimal direct financial rewards for governments or local populations; 
vague promises of investment, which limits enforceability; long-term concessions or leases, 
which limit reversibility and restitution of rights; and conflict with local land users/rights-
holders. The case of the South African investment in Congo, as shown in Box 3.2 below, 
epitomises some of the complexities of these deals, and the disputed question about the 
implications of large land deals for displacement of existing populations. 
  
Box 3.1 The ‘wasteland narrative’ 
Mounting evidence shows that much of the land being allocated on long-term leases or 
concessions to investors is already occupied and used – mostly by Africa’s 80 million small-
scale farmers who supply most of Africa’s food needs and produce 30% of its GDP. While 
powerful narratives rationalising such deals emphasise that land being targeted is ‘idle land’ 
or ‘wasteland’, case studies suggest that these terms often reflect an assessment of the 
productivity, rather than the existence, of current land uses. The International Institute for 
Environment and Development (IIED), for instance, found that in Ethiopia, all land 
allocations recorded at the national investment promotion agency are classified as involving 
‘wastelands’, with no pre-existing users. But in a country with a population of about 75 
million, the vast majority of whom live in rural areas, this formal classification is open to 
question. Indeed, shifting cultivation and dry-season grazing have been widespread in 
these regions, but have gone unacknowledged by officials in charge of leasing out land. 
Now, a growing body of more detailed case studies shows the extent to which small-scale 
farmers have been displaced; pastoralists have lost their grazing land; and rural people 
have lost access to crucial common property resources. In sum, even land that is not 
farmed is often used by and important to the survival of local communities. Thus, 
discourses about ‘empty land’ are deeply and dangerously misleading. 
Sources: IIED (2009); Cotula et al. (2009) 
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The Bank’s Sleeping Giants report acknowledged that, without land-tenure reforms and 
improved land administration, its proposals for commercialisation would be likely to lead to 
widespread abuse and dispossession: 
Providing secure and transferable land rights is critical to protecting the interests of 
indigenous populations while allowing entrepreneurial farmers to acquire unused land in 
regions of low population density. This allows land to change hands over time and to 
flow to those who can use it most productively, which in turn provides incentives to 
invest in increasing land productivity. The new Mozambican land policy and land law 
provide a state-of-the-art framework for balancing competing interests, and the legal 
frameworks of Madagascar and Zambia are similarly well designed. (World Bank, 2009: 
182) 
But the countries mentioned as ‘best practice’ examples of land-rights administration – 
including Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, and Zambia – are centres of major transnational 
land deals that appear to be excluding local small-scale farmers from new patterns of 
accumulation, transforming some small-scale farmers into low-paid wage labourers, and 
producing land-related conflict. As Alden Wily (2011) has noted, legal reforms to secure land 
rights are necessary but not sufficient as a condition to safeguard the land rights of local 
populations living under forms of informal, unregistered and customary tenure in the face of 
investor and state interests. 
Box 3.2 South African deal in Congo 
The resource-rich Central African country, Congo Brazzaville, enjoys fertile, rich and under-
used land. Since the colonial period, the government has entered into various land deals 
with foreign companies to boost agricultural production and earn foreign exchange. In order 
to facilitate transfer of land to the foreigners, the Congo government annexed public land 
and registered it as state farms. The foreign partners abandoned the land during the war. 
The indigenous populations encroached onto the land and are currently sustaining their 
livelihoods on these former state farms. As the country emerged from the war, the 
government sought out investors to revive the agricultural sector. In October 2009 the 
government allegedly signed a deal with a consortium of South African Farmers known as 
AgriSA. The deal aimed to transfer at least 200,000 ha to AgriSA for the South African 
Farmers to invest in agricultural development. The land that was earmarked for this 
development is in the fertile Niari valley. The details of the contract are not available, but it 
is believed that this is where the land is located. The contract was signed between the 
government and AgriSA in a bilateral agreement. The Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of 
Land Management in Dolisie facilitated the mapping of the land and AgriSA reconnaissance 
of the area. A site visit in August 2011 revealed that the area under discussion involved 
some three to seven villages in Niari. The villages include Dehesse, Malolo Village I, Malolo 
Village II and Macabana. The population includes former refugees who were fleeing the war 
from Angola, the indigenous Bakka, the Kuni and Punu local populations. The communities 
are involved in subsistence and commercial agricultural activities. The communities rely 
heavily on forest produce. Jobs are scarce since the main commercial agriculture and 
mining activities were closed down during the war. In January 2011, officials from the 
Ministry of Lands visited Malolo Village II to inform the villagers about the land deal. 
Although they have not signed any paper and were explicitly told that no monetary 
compensation will be given, the community was excited at the prospect of revived 
development, market and employment opportunities. In Dehesse, the chief was aware of 
the deal but nobody had informed or consulted him. All he has seen was people pitching 
pegs in his village fields, grazing, forest and schoolyard and water source. He does not 
know if the village will be relocated. Since he has not spoken to anyone or signed any 
agreement, he does not know if he and his village will be compensated. 
Sources: Hall (2011); PLAAS fieldwork notes (2011) 
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3.3 Speculative interests in land 
Financial institutions – banks, sovereign wealth funds, but also hedge funds – have become 
significantly involved in acquiring rights to African farmland (Daniel, 2011).  
Box 3.3 below illustrates the very lenient terms and large scale of a land deal, and the ways in 
which weak consultation prior to concluding this lease, and the loose definition of the terms of 
the contract, potentially threatened the land rights and livelihoods of a large number of people. 
The context of this deal was that, by early 2011, shortly before the independence of South 
Sudan, 9% of the area of this new country had been leased out in large-scale land deals, and 
98% of the land transacted in this way was designated ‘community land’, not ‘state land’ 
(Deng, 2011). After high-profile negative publicity, the deal was ultimately cancelled in August 
2011 (Fake, 2011). 
 
The case above demonstrates the need to improve governments’ capacities to leverage better 
terms, to specify allowable land uses and resource access, to set in place limits on the size and 
duration of deals, to conduct (and require investors to conduct) consultations sufficient to meet 
the international standard of ‘free, prior and informed consent’ (FPIC), and to conduct 
valuations of land (and water and other natural resources) that take into account the true 
opportunity cost for local people and the nation, for the full duration of the contract. 
3.4 Water grabbing? 
Water is a central but often ignored component of land deals. The right of investors to access 
the water required to cultivate acquired land is embedded within land leases, but is seldom 
paid for (Woodhouse, 2011). Most investors favour land with good access to water and the 
potential for irrigation: contrary to the World Bank’s expectations of commercialisation in the 
Guinea Savannah zone, little of the investment is for rain-fed cropping. Given that much of the 
continent is projected to experience greater water scarcity, the impacts of land deals on other 
water users, now and into the future, are critical areas for investigation. The presence of large, 
Box 3.3 Nile Trading and Development Inc. in South Sudan 
The Nile Trading and Development Inc. (NTD) is one of the largest deals in South Sudan. 
Located in Central Equatoria State, this company acquired an allocation of 600,000 ha with 
the option to expand by an additional 400,000 ha. Nile Trading cited three intended land 
uses: timber extraction and plantations; biofuel production of palm oil and biodiesel plants 
like jatropha; and carbon credits – though the contract itself is highly permissive about land 
uses, stating that: ‘The Cooperative acknowledges and agrees that the Company may 
undertake any other activity permitted by the laws of Southern Sudan on the Leased Land.’ 
The contract was concluded between NTD (a US-registered company) and Mukaya Payam 
Cooperative (the district council in the area concerned). The contract was signed by the 
paramount chief and endorsed by the governor of Central Equatoria State. The terms of the 
contract required the payment of a one-off fee of 75,000 Sudanese pounds (equivalent at 
the time to about US$25,000). This was paid to the chief of just one of the four districts in 
the county affected by the deal; although no regular rental was payable the district council 
would acquire 40%–50% of profits. The lease was for 49 years, but these rights were 
transferable – in other words, they can be sold on. Despite being projected as a 
forestry/carbon/conservation project, the contract included full mineral rights. It contained 
no specification of responsibilities on the investor’s part to create jobs, to avoid 
displacement of local people, or to compensate them. There were allegations that local 
communities in affected area were not consulted at all and are unaware of the terms of the 
deal, that the council pursued a ‘divide and rule’ strategy, and did not provide the affected 
communities with consistent information. Depending on how land was to be used, the deal 
could potentially affect tens or even hundreds of thousands of people living on and using 
the land in question. No environmental and social impact assessment was conducted.  
Sources: Deng (2011); Oakland Institute (2011a). 
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corporate water users is likely to spark conflicts between competing uses and users – as has 
already been seen in the volatile regions around the shrinking Lake Chad (ILC, 2011 
forthcoming). 
Allen (2011) shows how the outsourcing of food production to meet demand in the West (and 
East) amounts to the de facto export of ‘virtual water’ from Africa and other regions being 
targeted, and how its corollary – water shortages – are being imported to these regions. This 
growing competition over control of water resources is likely to become more pronounced in 
the future, and already its potential to shift geopolitical alliances, and to generate political 
instability within and between countries, is becoming evident. The competition over control of 
the substantial irrigable land of the Suud in South Sudan is one example; in this case, 
investors from Europe and North America are joined by those from the Gulf States of the 
Middle East, as well as China and South Africa, among others, in a complex process of 
competition for control of water, specifically in the context of agreements concerning off-take 
from the Nile (Keulertz, 2011). The combination of geopolitically strategic location, secure 
water resources and fragility of political institutions and land governance in this case make for 
high stakes over allocation of long-term leases. 
Box 3.4 on the Malibya deal in Mali illustrates the ways in which the rights of local land and 
water users may come to be seen as impediments to national economic development 
objectives. The context for the deal is that Mali is aiming to become a food exporter, the 
‘granary of West Africa’. 
 
Box 3.4 Malibya deal in Mali 
The Malibya deal was concluded between the Government of Mali and the state-owned 
Libyan Africa Investment Company, involving the allocation of 100,000 ha in the Office du 
Niger region of Mali, for free (no rental) for a period of 50 years. The aim of the project was 
to produce hybrid rice and raise cattle, and the Government of Mali expected benefits in the 
forms of major investment in irrigation infrastructure (especially canals) as well as roads. 
‘Food security’ is one of the objectives of the contract, though it is unclear whether this 
refers to the food security of the investor or host country – nor is there any restriction on 
export of produce. The contract itself involves no provisions for compensation; rather it 
specifies that the Government of Mali holds responsibility for any displacement. It provides 
the investor with elaborate tax breaks, including a total exemption from production tax for 
30 years, an eight-year exemption from license and corporate fees, and tariff and duty 
exemption for imports of inputs and equipment. The contract, just six pages long, was not 
made available to local people or civil society organisations (CSOs) until months after it was 
signed. As Ibrahim Coulibaly, President of the farmers’ organisation, Coordination Nationale 
des Organisations Paysannes (CNOP) complained: ‘It was a fait accompli. It was negotiated 
between the Malian president and the Libyan head of state. And no president anywhere has 
the right to give away his land like that’. Like many other deals, the Malibya contract 
includes the right of the investor to the water required, without any mechanism to adjust 
this entitlement in the face of changing water availability in the future. It specifies the right 
of Libya to the ‘necessary amount of water in the period from June to December and will 
plant less water consuming crops than rice for the dry period.’ This entitlement for the 
investor implies a corresponding obligation on Mali to enable this access to water, even at 
the cost of other water users, now and in the future. The potential impact on the Niger 
River was not estimated; indeed, it is unclear whether any environmental and social impact 
assessment was conducted. The Government of Mali expressed the expectation that 
irrigation construction would spur local development, but this was not specified as a 
requirement, and the Libyan investor awarded contracts for this construction to a Chinese 
company, CGC. The hybrid rice seed to be cultivated is also owned by a Chinese company. 
In this context, the major benefit for local people would be through employment, and the 
contract envisaged that the project could ‘provide employment for all inhabitants of the 
region Ségou’ and ‘priority will be given to the local population’, but did not specify any 
commitments in terms of the scale, duration or quality of employment. As one observer 
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3.5 Food versus fuel? 
Contestation over the changes brought about by large-scale land acquisitions extend not only 
to issues of access to and control of land and related natural resources, but also the types of 
uses to which these are put. A key dispute among stakeholders, and a concern for 
development partners, is whether the rapid expansion of feedstocks for biodiesel is displacing 
food production, and therefore whether there is likely to be a direct negative impact on food 
security at household, community and national levels. In Africa, most of this expansion has 
taken the form of cultivation of jatropha curcas, the Latin American shrub from whose seeds oil 
can be extracted; sugar cane for refining into bio-ethanol; and to a lesser degree maize, soy 
and palm oil. There is evidence that transitions of land uses from food crops to biofuels have 
deepened poverty and gender inequality (Nhantumbo and Salomao, 2010; Oxfam 
International, 2008), but also that, depending on appropriate institutional arrangements and 
business models, smallholder production can be combined with food crop production through 
intercropping, and that local refining of biodiesel could play a crucial role in meeting the fuel 
needs of rural communities (Schut et al., 2010). Increasingly, there appears to be 
convergence of agreement that, while the biofuel expansion has been controversial, it is not 
these crops in themselves that threaten food security, but rather the social relations through 
which their production is organised. With impetus from the Sustainable Biofuels Initiative, the 
search is on to improve the ways in which the biofuels industry can support improved land 
governance, equitable benefit-sharing and food security in its areas of operation. At the same 
time, there is evidence that many investors in this sector have not used much of the large 
areas they acquired during the oil price spikes a few years ago, and that the feasibility of many 
projections for this industry are now in doubt (World Bank, 2010). The case of Tanzania, as 
described in Box 3.5 below, suggests that these problems require systematic responses from 
government, and the framing of new policy that addresses concerns over displacement of local 
people and their land uses. 
noted, ‘The whole area is used by herders, smallholder agriculture, cattle trails and other 
natural resource uses. They have customary rights which are ignored by the new 
investments, because the government does not recognise them.’ Further, it is clear that 
local people were differentially affected: ‘Women farmers who produced and sold 
vegetables from garden plots have been adversely affected by the Malibya project. Canal 
construction resulted in the loss of the women’s land and livelihoods without compensation 
or consultation.’ As Mama Keita (aged 73), leader of Soumouni village, recounted, ‘They 
told us this would be the last rainy season for us to cultivate our fields; after that, they will 
level all the houses and take the land… We were told that Qaddafi owns this land.’  
Sources: GIZ (2011); Oakland Institute (2011b). 
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The Procana case in Mozambique demonstrates the possibility of national governments 
enforcing terms of lease agreements. In Gaza province in Mozambique, a company named 
Procana acquired 30 000 ha for sugar-cane production in 2007, on the basis of a lease 
concluded with the Mozambican government. Its purpose was to produce bio-ethanol as well 
as co-generation to produce electricity, thereby supplying national energy needs. The 
community consultation process was flawed, in that negotiations were highly centralised and 
the agreement was shrouded in secrecy, meaning that many community members were not 
consulted at all. Over time, the company encroached onto the community’s arable land and 
diverted the water source used by local farmers for its own purposes. The company failed to 
honour pledges to drill boreholes, set aside land for subsistence in the irrigation scheme and to 
invest in other infrastructure that would be of benefit to surrounding populations. Its 
projections of the value of investment were not realised. These lapses on its part, and violation 
of the terms of its lease, incensed the community and tensions were rising. After several failed 
mediation efforts by Mozambican NGOs, the government cancelled the land lease. However, 
the land was not restored to the community (Borras et al., 2011b).  
At the same time, emerging evidence shows that the use of innovative tools and more 
inclusive and localised negotiations can potentially produce land deals that are more 
sustainable and responsive to the situations of local communities. Box 3.6 summarises such a 
case in Sierra Leone. 
 
Box 3.6 Inclusive, equitable land deal in Sierra Leone 
In Sierra Leone, the Chiefdom Councils Act, Section 28 (d) of the Local Government Act 
1994 and the Provinces Lands Act (Cap 122) require a company wanting to lease land to 
pay surface rent to local authorities. In the arrangement with the government, the 
Paramount Chief, his Native Administration, the District Council and the landowners sign an 
agreement/lease and share the surface rent in equal proportions. Compensation is required 
if housing and crops of local people in the surface rent area are affected and compensation 
must be negotiated separately. The biofuel venture in Sierra Leone was initiated by Addax 
Bioenergy (see www.addaxbioenergy.com). The company aimed to produce irrigated 
sugarcane on about 10,000 ha and food crop production on additional land. After initial 
Economic Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) estimates found that the lease could directly 
affect 13,617 people (1,375 households) the venture was redesigned so that in the end 
only 77 people in two small hamlets were affected. To minimise the resettlement impacts, 
the ESIA recommended Addax develop a comprehensive Resettlement Action Plan in 
accordance with the Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF). The legal provisions and the 
ESIA process allowed locals to secure additional benefits and compensation payments from 
Addax. Addax's estate-design process avoids using wet lowlands that most residents rely on 
Box 3.5 Biofuels in Tanzania 
In Tanzania, 640,000 ha have been allocated for biofuels production – for jatropha, sugar 
cane and palm oil – and potential investors have applied for a total of 4 million ha. The 
areas targeted are forested areas on which villagers depend for food and livestock grazing – 
a crucial source of livelihood. Although the Village Land Act of 2009 requires that people be 
compensated for any land loss, the processes for consulting on this, and determining the 
level and manner of payment of compensation, was fraught with conflict, not least because 
much of the compensation was paid to state authorities rather than local people. 
Investments based on out-grower models have reportedly been less conflictual and secured 
more local support. Following widespread opposition to land allocation to biofuels investors, 
and evidence of people being dispossessed, the government imposed a moratorium on new 
projects, and developed in consultation with civil society a set of National Biofuels 
Guidelines to address concerns about the displacement of local people and the shift from 
food to fuel production. 
Source: Sulle (2009) 
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The above case presents one of the emerging examples of how land deals could be done in 
ways that not only improve land governance by increasing transparency but also minimise 
costs to the community and improve outcomes in the short and long term. The example also 
highlights how innovative tools like the ESIAs can be used to forecast and pre-empt the impact 
of land deals on community livelihoods in this case by changing the location, size and 
boundaries of developments to reduce displacement impacts (Andrew and van Vlaenderen, 
2011).
for most crop production. Addax also intended to compensate the small number of livestock 
farmers through rental payments. Impacts on natural resource use have also been 
minimised by Addax avoiding forest areas that are the main source of these resources. 
Local residents have, and will continue to be given, the opportunity to harvest any natural 
resources they need from the leased land before Addax proceeds to cultivate the biofuel 
feedstocks. Getting investors to engage land rights-holders to negotiate lease agreements 
forced discussions about land and displacement to be initiated much earlier and in more 
detail. It also resulted in some committees being set up to resolve particular issues and the 
establishment of a company–community relations office and grievance mechanisms.  
The Sierra Leone case underlines the relative benefits of lease agreements and payments 
being made with and to the land rights holders. This leaves land ownership in community 
hands and can ensure that land rights-holders receive annual rent payments. Although the 
proposed rental payments in the Addax case were not sufficient to compensate for lost 
livelihoods based on cultivation, they were significantly better than the one-off 
compensation payments some biofuel companies paid to communal land rights-holders in 
other African countries. 
Source: Andrew and van Vlaenderen (2011) 
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4 Outcomes of and responses to ‘land grabbing’ 
Compared to the situation three years ago when very little was known about the character and 
scale of large-scale transactions in land, the debates about what is happening and how to 
respond have evolved with the rapid mobilisation of various stakeholders. These include the 
international community, the investors, the host countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and 
Eastern Europe and the communities whose livelihoods have been directly affected by the 
commercial pressures on land. These debates have since broadened from highlighting the 
immediate impacts of the deals to projections by economists, environmentalists, sociologists, 
lawyers and political scientists on the possible long-term impacts of the developments (Borras 
et al., 2011). The generation of a body of knowledge on the phenomenon of large-scale 
transactions has provided a basis for more analytical work and formulation of strategic plans 
(Foresight, 2011; IFAD, 2011). This section focuses on some of the initiatives and outcomes of 
the activity regarding commercial pressures on land, specifically in sub-Saharan Africa. The 
discussion illustrates not only the diversity of players but also draws attention to the positions 
of various stakeholders and those who are shaping policy discourses. It highlights the forms of 
social differentiation that have arisen and the diverse responses by civil society to the impacts 
of the commercial pressures on land in sub-Saharan Africa. 
4.1 New forms of social differentiation 
This section deals with the differentiated impacts of pressures on land, noting that 
communities in areas affected by large-scale land deals are not affected in uniform ways. 
Rather, the emerging evidence suggests that while some local people are well placed to benefit 
from new investments, others may carry the costs of land-use change and displacement. One 
set of outcomes that has been documented is the concentration of landholdings and capture of 
income streams by elites, and increased landlessness. However, there are various practices, 
and some better involving distribution of benefits among affected populations, and efforts to 
mitigate the effects on poorer and more vulnerable members of communities, have been 
noted. 
The commercial pressures exerted on land may alter landholding structures in ways that 
influence people’s relationships with the resource and also shape class formations. Large-scale 
transactions in land have precipitated the conversion of customary land to private and in many 
cases corporate hands (Daley and Englert, 2010). Where communities were previously 
pursuing similar livelihood options, differentiation may occur. Differentiation refers to the 
development of increasingly complex structures within societies, in particular more elaborate 
divisions of labour. Through this process, the peasantry splits into different classes, namely 
capitalists, wage labourers, non-agricultural petty commodity producers. Second, 
differentiation may refer to a stratification process within the peasantry (Bernstein, 1986; 
Maast, 1996). Market expansion and/or modernisation such as that caused by 
commercialisation of land induce differentiation. This is explained in terms of altered relations 
to the means of production, in this case land. Commercial pressures of land alter relations by 
introducing a market and capitalist mode of production into predominantly peasant mode of 
production. As a result there will be diversification.  
Concentration 
Some people and or institutions will accumulate land at the expense of others. This process of 
concentration is defined by Reyna (1987) as the process by which a large number of people 
are disposed of land and it concentrates in the hands of a few. Concentration also occurs 
through pledging and personalisation of common land by local leaders (Berry, 1988). The 
resultant class formation is one in which some fewer individuals control land while others 
increasingly become landless. Those who accumulate land are the ones who can afford to 
purchase the commodity. This results in what Nidhi Thandon calls ‘a portrait of contradictions’ 
in which large-scale land transactions simultaneously create large-scale farmers who will earn 
super profits as commodity speculators, and the production of a class of peasant farmers who 
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depend on the land but do not and increasingly cannot own land (Thandon, 2010). The process 
has been observed by Chachage (2010), who recorded a 467% rate of increase of large-scale 
farms in Kigoma region of Tanzania between 1987–1988 and 1994–1995. In another 
Tanzanian example, in October 2009 Prime Minister Mizengo Pinda visited the area as part of 
his mission to promote the government’s agribusiness-oriented ‘Kilimo Kwanza/Agriculture 
First’ initiative. While there he was quoted in various media sources as directing regional and 
district officials to remove about 2,000 villagers from the farm and relocate them elsewhere. In 
line with the discourse of invasion that informs many governmental evictions in the country, 
these villagers were labelled ‘squatters’/‘invaders’ who were said to be occupying, albeit 
illegally, about 300 ha of the farm (Chachange, 2010). 
Dispossession 
The dispossessed people will move into smaller pieces of land where they are characterised by 
impoverishment and loss of control and eventually landlessness as they abandon an 
increasingly unviable livelihood. Greater population density, in-migration and competition over 
land resources precipitated by commercialisation results in increased conflict. Exclusionary 
metaphors are used to narrow he definition of those who belong. Since, in patrilineal areas, 
primary claimants are male, females become increasingly vulnerable to dispossession. The 
outsiders are labelled as ‘squatters’, strangers or immigrants. 
Intergenerational relations: In situations where communities previously followed a subsistence 
lifestyle, commercialisation of the land interferes with inheritance-based transfers. The demand 
for land leads to a land market and increasingly smaller and unviable parcels. As a result, able 
the younger generation have to work ever-decreasing plots of land. Faced with unviable 
livelihoods, the younger generations will become workers on the commercial farms while 
others will abandon agricultural livelihoods and migrate out of the area to seek alternative 
livelihood strategies. 
Gender 
The ways in which women in rural Africa relate to land makes them specifically vulnerable to 
commercial pressures on land. Land is the foundation for the ecosystem and supports 
community livelihoods. Women’s access to land is a source of identity. The identity renders a 
woman eligible for social support and security from other community members. The value of 
land for women transcends mere economic value especially for those who are marginalised 
from mainstream economic activities. Women’s responsibility for household food security in 
customary tenure areas means that the land is an important strategic resource. The current 
land transactions tend to ignore their possible gendered impacts. This is because women are 
treated as an invisible component of homogenous communities. Research by Tsikata and Golah 
(2010) on globalisation and land tenure showed that as a result of the failure to take gender 
relations into account, the impacts on women are neither anticipated nor proactively mediated. 
Awumbila and Tsikata (2010) demonstrate that gender relations are one of the several social 
relations implicated in the reorganisation of livelihoods, intersecting with class, ethnicity, 
kinship, relations between migrants and locals and between chiefs and users and livelihood 
options of men and women (Tsikata, 2010). The commercial pressures on land, which induce 
social differentiation, therefore influence gender relations, either exacerbating or ameliorating 
gender inequalities. Land grabbing is exerting pressure on customary tenure land, which 
relatively is the most accessible form of tenure for women in Africa. The differential gender 
impacts of large-scale transactions in land are summarised in Box 3.6 below. 
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The example in Box 4.2 illustrates the gendered impact of a large-scale land investment in 
Maragra, Mozambique. 
 
Box 4.1 The gendered distribution of costs of large-scale land deals 
Women bear disproportionate costs: Displacement and land reallocation increase pressures 
on women’s already tenuous land rights. Displacement also undermines women’s capacity 
to meet their primary role in subsistence food production. The common lands (usually 
grazing and forest) upon which women depend for foraging and firewood are most likely to 
be given away for foreign investment. Consequently, women will disproportionately bear 
the burden of biodiversity loss. Women directly bear the costs of higher food prices that 
result from the commercialisation of staple foods. Women will experience greater demand 
on their labour if the commercial activity on the land is labour-intensive. If land grabbing is 
accompanied by water appropriation, this may have a negative impact on women’s access 
to water for domestic use through the pollution of water sources, reduction of the water 
table and/or the privatisation of a water source. Women who are responsible for securing 
water for domestic use will be forced to adjust to such changes. 
During the transaction: Women and men are not likely to be equally represented in 
decision-making fora. Women lack education and adequate information to make informed 
decisions. Women’s inferior position in domestic land relations mean that they lack legal 
resources to defend any land claims they may have.  
Women are marginalised in the sharing of benefits from large-scale transactions in land: 
Benefits in the form of compensation, employment and income-generation opportunities 
normally privilege titled and primary right-holders, who are men. This increasingly 
marginalises women-headed households. Men are better placed to assume control of the 
benefits of the transactions. Where employment opportunities are available, women are 
more likely to be employed as casual labourers with less secure employment and land-
tenure rights. Mothers will be marginalised in employment schemes that do not 
acknowledge the need to provide child-care facilities.  
Sources: Behrman et al. (2011); Daley (2011); Tsikata and Golah (2010) 
Pressures on land in sub-Saharan Africa: social differentiation and societal responses 
24 
 
Commercial pressures on land in sub-Saharan Africa have increased inequality among the 
different groups. Land concentration in the hands of the few has meant that an increasing 
number of rural people have limited control over land and other natural resources. While the 
social differentiation arising from large-scale land deals is not new in itself, the number of the 
vulnerable classes is much higher. Unfortunately, the current structuring of land deals 
marginalise those who stand to lose the most, which in effect increases their vulnerability. 
Women and peasant farmers are among the majority of those who, over time, are being 
dispossessed from the land and from the benefits accruing from the investments. It is 
important to broaden the frameworks within which land deals are formulated to ensure wider 
participation of and evaluate impacts on the more vulnerable members of society. 
4.2 Civil society responses 
The increasing pressures on land and livelihood vulnerability of the poor have precipitated an 
interest in the resource by institutions that are involved in land governance. These institutions 
range from state to non-state actors and civil society organisations (CSOs). The latter are 
motivated by reasons which range from concerns about the lack of capacity of the affected 
communities, lack of resources to mobilise the law and other mechanisms to defend their land 
rights and the power asymmetry between communities and investors. The state’s failure to 
fulfil its role as a regulator and of resource transactions and protector of poor people’s land 
rights has created a vacuum that some CSOs have mobilised to fill. Some global organisations 
are working to regulate what seems to be a ‘free for all’ plunder of developing countries’ land 
resources by financial investors from the more developed world, while CSOs are working 
Box 4.2 Gendered impacts of sugar contract farming in Mozambique 
In 2007, the Mozambican government approved the strategy of the Green Revolution to 
stimulate agricultural production and alleviate poverty. This resulted in the revival of 
abandoned sugar plantations. The Green Revolution introduced opportunities for 
employment, training and access to loans for participants to invest in sugar-cane 
production. In Maragra, sugar-cane producers are small-scale farmers who are sub-
contracted to produce for the factory. As part of the programme, peasants, 80% of them 
women, were organised into associations to enable them to participate. Most of the women 
in Maragra are lone mothers, whose average age is 26 years. The women hired by the 
factory are mainly unskilled casual workers whose conditions of employment mean that 
they are paid less and have less job security than male workers. Women’s employment 
status excludes them from old-age benefits, childcare assistance and secure land tenure. 
Their labour rights are restricted by the fact that trade union membership and attendant 
benefits marginalise seasonal work. As sugar cane is a non-food crop, the women still need 
to produce and or secure subsistence food for their families, balancing this against factory 
work. The company has provided plots of land for workers to produce subsistence food, but 
this is fully allocated and is occupied by the families of retired workers, usually older 
women. Newer employees and casual workers, the majority of whom are young women, 
either have to rent subsistence land from the retired workers’ families or use the land that 
is located further away from the factory. The distance adds to the work burden and makes 
it difficult for these women to balance subsistence labour, childcare and casual employment 
in the commercial farming venture. As a result, women often resort to hiring out their 
labour to those who have land closer to the factory or renting land for subsistence use. This 
places additional pressure on their meagre salaries and their labour. The programme also 
increases the demand for land, which in turn pushes up the cost of renting it. Women, who 
represent the majority of tenants, struggle to pay the high rentals and are increasingly 
forced to farm on smaller pieces of land. The growing competition for land has prompted 
inheritance-related disputes as relatives of deceased men seek to dispossess widows of 
land to take advantage of the land market.  
Source: Andrade et al. (2010) 
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individually, in regional coalitions as well as forming global coalitions across the North–South 
divide.  
The International Land Coalition (ILC) has identified some CSO efforts to track land-based 
investments, for example by organisations like GRAIN which documents reports of land-related 
investments and leaks contracts of ‘land grabs’ on the dedicated www.farmlandgrab.org 
website; desk-based research papers by PLAAS and IIED; empirical research papers by GTZ, 
OECD, and related developments including the IFPRI guidelines, FAO Voluntary Guidelines on 
land and the African Union Framework and Guidelines (Taylor and Bending, 2009). 
The ILC, with its partners Oxfam-Novib, RECONCILE, IFPRI, Agter, CDE, CIRAD, ActionAid, 
IALTA, and GRET, have set up a web-based portal to collect, systematise and publish 
information on commercial pressures on land, large-scale land acquisitions and alternatives to 
them. It is meant to fuel awareness and evidence-based debate on this phenomenon, and 
promote the ability of all stakeholders to identify and promote informed and equitable solutions 
(http://www.commercialpressuresonland.org). 
Other CSOs are making practical interventions. For instance, the National Union of Peasants 
(UNAC) in Mozambique, which is playing a leading role in defending the rights and interests of 
its members, promoting sustainable agriculture and integrated development with the aim of 
achieving social justice and securing peasants’ livelihoods. UNAC together with Justiça 
Ambiental has been working with peasants to generate tangible evidence on the negative 
impacts of commercial pressures on land. Their study involved the mapping of investments, 
extent, type of tenure arrangements and the use to which the land was being put as well as 
highlighting potential conflict areas for monitoring and mitigation. The initiative aims to use the 
information to make recommendations for improving the governance of large-scale commercial 
land transactions (Justiça Ambiental and UNAC, 2011). 
The International Development Law Organisation (IDLO) is involved in a community land-titling 
initiative in Liberia, Mozambique and Uganda, gathering evidence on the type of support that 
communities require to successfully complete community land titling, and on what support 
best helps to protect the land rights of vulnerable groups in the context of decentralised land 
management and administration. The action-research provides communities with different 
levels of legal assistance with respect to land titling (www.idlo.int). 
The Zambia Land Alliance (ZAL) has mobilised community leaders and NGOs to lobby for 
improved land governance, land policy and dialogues on land grabbing. In 2010, ZAL facilitated 
a dialogue with traditional leaders, which resulted in a declaration delivered to the Zambian 
government. The ZAL has also been working with other CSOs in Zambia to push for the 
development of a national land policy as a basis for improving the governance of large-scale 
land transactions.  
The International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) and the Institute for Poverty, 
Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) organised a seminar with the Pan African Parliament in July 
2011. The seminar provided a common platform for African parliamentarians as well as CSOs 
from West, Central, East and Southern Africa to be more involved in discussions and decision-
making on the problems and challenges facing the continent and create a roadmap for further 
continental action. Parliamentarians, government officials, the African Union–Economic 
Commission for Africa–African Development Bank (AU-ECA-AfDB) Land Policy Initiative (LPI), 
NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency, donors, academics and CSOs all attended. The 
meeting produced a set of recommendations and a draft resolution aimed at improving the 
governance of large-scale transactions in land, calling on the African Union to generate 
guidelines concerning such transactions, and for a moratorium on further large-scale leases 
pending adoption of such guidelines.  
In June 2011, women and men from across sub-Saharan Africa attended a conference 
(convened by Oxfam in partnership with numerous farmers’ associations and others) in Nairobi 
to inform and review the progress on the advancement of women’s rights to land, property and 
freedom from sexual and gender-based violence. The conference communiqué called on 
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national governments, the African Union, and CSOs, grassroots women and development 
partners to take action aimed at securing women’s land rights against commercial pressures 
on land. Box 4.3 below highlights some of the communique’s calls: 
 
CSOs have been marginalised from large-scale land transactions, mainly because the deals are 
signed between governments and investors. This lack of transparency also means that there is 
little information on the size of the deals, their potential impact and the identity of the 
signatories around which CSOs can strategise. As a result, they tend to focus on post-deal 
implementation, which means that most CSOs are clustered around research, whistle blowing, 
information-generation, watchdog functions and litigation on behalf of and dialogue with 
affected communities. This means that CSOs are generally found opposing land deals rather 
than looking for joint solutions with stakeholders in the deals. Positioning themselves as critics 
puts CSOs on a potentially confrontational path with investors and government negotiators. 
The ideal situation is for more transparent, participatory and inclusive land deal governance.  
  
Box 4.3 Mobilising for African women’s land rights 
 Engage governments and multilateral institutions in the development and 
reviewing of international guidelines and instruments in order to improve the 
recognition of the rights, roles and needs of women in them; 
 Engage with governments on reviewing national land policies and laws using the 
AU Framework and Guidelines on Land Policy in Africa, and monitor the 
implementation of agriculture and land policies and ensure that gender 
indicators are incorporated in the tools used;  
 Commission the drafting of a women’s rights analysis and an ecological 
sustainability analysis for each of the four CAADP pillars; 
 Lead and resource a process for integration of gender and climate change in the 
roles, responsibilities, and accountability mechanisms of CAADP to ensure 
adaptation and capacity building for women and ensure that financing climate 
change will mainstream women as custodian of land and forests; 
 The development and finalisation of agricultural and food security policies, 
legislations, and programmes that involve and prioritise women’s secure access 
to land;  
 enhancement of the realisation of the right to food and the food 
sovereignty concepts and principles;  
 ending the corruption and poor governance that allows investors to 
undermine the rights of women; 
 the promotion of agriculture Investments in that benefit woman and other 
small scale farmers and pastoralists; 
 ensure gender-sensitive resettlement processes that provide women land 
titles and resettlement packages, and protect the rights of orphaned 
children;  
 ensure that policy, programmes and budgets take into account the specific 
needs and roles of women farmers and give priority to systematic 
involvement of women and smallholder farmers in agricultural policy 
making, programme design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation 
and conduct gendered social and ecological impact assessments prior to 
signing off any national agricultural investment plans.  
Source: www.landforafricanwomen.org  
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4.3 Trends and potential future trajectories of conflict, social and political 
unrest 
The re-valuation of African farmland as a destination for global investment, and the rise in the 
number and size of transnational land leases, raise crucial questions regarding the future of 
land-based livelihoods in rural Africa. Will these deals offer new avenues to employment and 
cash incomes in ‘de-agrarianising’ societies or will they enclose common property resources 
(CPR) with little investment or output to show for it? Will social differentiation prompt new 
struggles at the local level, between women and men, between cultivators and herders, 
between the poor and elites, between chiefs and citizens? How will governments, at local, 
regional and national levels, manage their competing imperatives to secure the rights and 
livelihoods of citizens and attract investment? How will investors respond to challenges 
concerning the legitimacy of their land leases, and how will disputes between investors, 
governments and/or local communities be resolved, and in which fora? Will these deals 
precipitate new (or aggravate existing) competition and tensions over land? How much of this 
might take on an ethnic, or nationalist, character? To what degree could the rising pressure on 
land alter migration patterns, both within and between countries?  
These are complex questions regarding the long-term implications of large-scale land deals in 
Africa, and there have been no definitive studies on the long-term implications for conflict, as 
far as we are aware. Three dimensions that should be considered in any assessment of the 
potential future trajectories for conflict arising from growing pressures on, and competition for, 
land are: competition among (i.e. between) rural populations; conflict within rural populations; 
and links between rural and urban mobilisation. 
Competition among rural populations 
Nunow (2011) shows how longstanding conflicts between settled cultivators (the Pokomo) and 
pastoralists (Oromo and Wardei) in the Tana River Delta on Kenya’s coast may be aggravated 
as large tracts of land over which both groups have struggled to gain control is now being 
leased out to investors from Canada, China, India, Qatar, South Africa, India and the USA 
among others (see Box 4.4). This demonstrates the degree to which emerging and 
documented conflicts run across at least four axes: (a) between local land users and their 
national government, which has allocated what they consider their land to commercial 
investors; (b) between local land users and local authorities, including traditional chiefs, local 
elites, and district or provincial governments; (c) between local land users and investors 
themselves, or their local intermediaries or representatives, for example in the form of damage 
to property; and (d) among different and competing categories of land users, as competition 
over resources is exacerbated, notably in this case between settled cultivators (many 
displaced) and pastoralists. 
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ILC (2011, forthcoming) also documents the growing transborder conflicts among communities 
in Niger and Chad affected by declining and unpredictable access to water in the regions 
bordering Lake Chad, which has shrunk dramatically. Given the nature of the water resources 
on which rural farmers depend, and the transboundary nature of water catchments, it is to be 
expected that such conflicts among populations may well take on an international character, as 
conflicts between states. As ILC has noted, conflicts are likely to emerge where resources are 
patchy and livelihoods are mobile, notably where concentrations of water lead to seasonal 
migrations that may be disrupted through increased off-take of water for new commercial 
farming enterprises, affecting downstream users as well as seasonal migrants, pastoralists and 
fishing communities. Despite transboundary water-management institutions – such as the Lake 
Chad Basin Commission, which brings together Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, 
Niger and Nigeria for co-management of its crucial water resources for neighbouring countries’ 
farming and other sectors – allocation of large-scale land leases in this water-stressed region 
has not been done through this multilateral forum, but rather by national governments. In this 
case, shrinkage in Lake Chad is a cause of conflicts among these diverse land users – conflicts 
which take on a transboundary, regional, and even ethnic, character – but is also likely to be 
exacerbated by growing large-scale commercial operations being established through land 
deals upstream, suggesting that the kinds of conflicts already experienced and documented 
could well take on a new scale and severity in the coming period. 
Box 4.4 Emerging dimensions of conflict in Tana River, Kenya  
Kenya’s Tana River delta, a biodiversity hotspot, is home to small-scale cultivators 
(Pokomo) and pastoralists (Oromo and Wardei). The delta is under unprecedented threat as 
corporations and foreign agencies scramble to exploit its riches for export crops, biofuels 
and minerals. So far, 40,000 ha have been allocated for a sugar plantation, and further 
proposed deals include 90,000 ha for a Canadian-based biofuels company to grow jatropha 
curcas; 120,000 ha to Qatar to grow food crops; and 20,000 ha to a Canadian mining 
company to mine titanium, among others. While the delta provides immense environmental 
services to the country, and livelihoods to its inhabitants, these developments may lead to 
the collapse of most of its services, displace settled farmers and fence off the grazing land 
of pastoralists. More than 25,000 people living in 30 villages will be evicted from their 
ancestral land due to the first of these deals alone. ‘The delta's people are trying to fight 
their own government over the huge blocks of land being turned over to companies’ 
(McVeigh, 2011). The conflicts already documented are not merely between local land users 
and their national government, but also are fuelling longstanding conflicts between settled 
cultivators farming on the floodplains, and pastoralists reliant on access to seasonal grazing 
lands and to water resources. Local leaders have threatened ‘war’ against the investors, 
and national and regional institutions (including the national government ministry) 
perceived to have leased out community-owned land. In the context of the wider politics of 
land in Kenya, such threats are to be taken seriously, particularly given the potential for 
such conflicts to take on an ethnic dimension. Nunow further points out that displacement 
of local food production has fuelled protests over food prices. In the Delta, one community 
elder, Omar Bocha Kofonde, claimed: ‘The hippos have gone, the fish, the birds, and the 
soil is salty. The goats and cattle have no grazing. The rivers used to flush out the sea 
water, now the sea is coming up on to our land because there is no river. Everything is in 
danger. People thought they owned the land, we have been here for hundreds of years. 
Now we will fight; we are ready to die, for what else is there?’ Another community 
representative, Ali Saidi Kichei of Ozi village, said: ‘This land ownership is giving us a 
headache. We know there are people who have sold our land when it isn't theirs to sell. 
They are criminals and we will fight them, with guns and with sticks.’ His community had 
sent a delegation to Nairobi to demand a meeting with the minister for lands, but could not 
obtain an adequate response which, he claimed, was what was fuelling ongoing conflict in 
the Delta: ‘We lived in paradise, in peace. Now what? No water, only salty water, land 
thieves and water thieves, and children with empty stomachs.’ 
Sources: McVeigh (2011); Nunow (2011) 
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Conflict within rural populations 
One widely documented early outcome of large-scale land deals is the rising social 
differentiation among affected communities. In contrast to investors’ depiction of local 
communities as uniformly benefiting from land-based investments, it is clear that neither do 
local communities benefit uniformly from such investments, nor that (in most cases) all local 
people lose out. Rather, the key question is about who wins and who loses (Borras et al., 
2011). Typically, it appears that these deals generate new dynamics of accumulation at the 
local level, through fees and duties (whether formal or informal), through value-chain linkages 
to upstream and downstream industries, through creation of employment (often highly 
gendered) and through partnerships with local producers. While in general it may be that rising 
inequality is a predictor for conflict, this has not been a necessary outcome of such deals. It is 
likely that longitudinal studies in the future will address the question of impacts on social 
relations over time, and search for correlations with various forms of conflict (whether overt or 
covert).  
Conflict between local populations and investors 
As the costs of displaced land uses become apparent, conflicts have been recorded between 
local populations and the incoming investors in their area – particularly prompted where the 
costs of curtailed land access are felt most keenly and the promised jobs have not 
materialised. One such case is at Chisumbanje in Zimbabwe’s Sabi River Valley, where 40,000 
ha claimed by the state was allocated by a national para-statal to a company comprising 
national and foreign investors to produce sugar cane for bio-ethanol. While local villagers had 
used this land for diverse cultivation purposes since the 1950s, their continued access to 10% 
of the land would become contingent on producing sugar cane as out-growers, on contract to 
the investors; other land uses, and access beyond this 10%, would be prohibited. As Chaunza 
(2011) documents, as a result of the conflict over the terms on which these investors acquired 
land in their area, a ‘multimillion dollar Ethanol production plant which is nearing competition 
is being threatened with destruction by disgruntled villagers who plan to invade the 40 000 
hectare sugar cane irrigation plantation to grow cotton’. The local traditional leader, Headman 
Chisumbanje, is on record warning that:  
The whole community is from next week going to plough in the area... We are not 
afraid of what comes after because we have no source of livelihood... other than the 
land which the company grabbed from us. As a matter of fact we have been battling 
with this company since it came here three years ago that we need our land which we 
used to rely on. We have been further impoverished by this company. (cited in 
Chaunza, 2011) 
Emerging social movements and other responses  
Although most of the documented work on land transactions has focused on the behaviour of 
the investors and governments, there has to date been limited coverage of social responses 
and organised resistance to the phenomenon. The institutions that have been involved in 
organising such resistance range from global movements like FIAN and La Via Campesina 
(LVC) to communities mobilising at the local level to engage with an investor and/or to defend 
their livelihoods.  
At the global level LVC, a movement that defends family-based production and food 
sovereignty, has been mobilising communities against land grabbing. The movement has been 
working with farmers’ organisations and peasant movements in Africa to explore alternatives 
to the neo-liberal model; building the capacity of local farmers through education, coalitions, 
facilitating networks; advancing alternative projects such as organic farming and sustainable 
agriculture; and mobilising affected farmers’ organisations, rural workers and landless people 
to engage with transnational companies (TNCs) and national governments. For example, LVC 
mobilised communities for a demonstration during the COP 17 meeting held in Durban in 
December 2011. It also held an International Farmers’ Conference in Bamako 17–19 
November 2011, which brought together people adversely affected by land grabs to ‘develop 
strategies to end the seizure of farmland at the expense of the rural family farming that feeds 
80% of the African population’. In Mozambique, LVC has worked with UNAC to establish 
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cooperative associations in the provinces and districts to dialogue and implement small 
sustainable and organic farming projects; train farmers and provide political education; and 
strengthen the farmers’ production base (Schachet, 2009; La Via Campesina 2011).  
In addition to the more organised responses, there have been cases of spontaneous 
resistance. Sam Moyo refers to processes of illegal restitution called ‘squatting’ or ‘land self-
provisioning’ as a crucial aspect of social responses to commercial pressures on land. Actions 
that Moyo broadly describes as ‘opposition to international conditionalities and narrow racially-
defined landed interests’ have been taken by communities in South Africa and Zimbabwe to 
express their frustration with the pace of the state-led initiatives to address longstanding 
historical grievances over large-scale land transfers (Moyo, 2000). The example of 
Chisumbanje community in Zimbabwe illustrates this response. 
The Mozambican community in Maragra, a sugar plantation situated outside Maputo, mobilised 
about 3,000 people and the media to demonstrate against land grabs. The government reacted 
by seizing the demonstrators’ agricultural tools and threatening them with arrest and eviction 
(participant in the ActionAid Consultation, 2010). While the power asymmetry between 
communities and other stakeholders in land transactions undermine the community’s capacity 
to respond and defend its land rights, the example from South Sudan illustrates how 
stakeholder coalitions have become an effective mechanism for mobilising responses to 
commercial pressures on land. 
The deal described in Box 3.3 was halted because of combined efforts of civil society groups, 
the media and the community. Civil society blew the whistle by publishing the deal on its 
website. This raised the community’s awareness. The local community and parliamentarians 
worked together and approached the national government to express their objection to this 
deal. Following extensive media coverage and protests, the South Sudan government cancelled 
the deal (see: http://www.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ID/5582/Default.aspx). 
In another example, which set an important precedent for communities who are losing their 
land rights, in 2010 the Enderois community won their case to retrieve land that was taken by 
the Kenyan government about 40 years after their eviction. The African Union endorsed an 
earlier ruling by the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights that found the Kenyan 
government guilty of violating the human rights of the Endorois by evicting them in the 1970s 
in order to create a wildlife reserve. The Kenyan government is obliged to compensate the 
Enderois and restitute their lands (see: http://hub.witness.org/Rightful place). 
Links between rural and urban mobilisation 
A core question for the future is whether rural populations affected by displacement or 
disruption to their land rights and livelihoods as a result of land deals might form links with 
urban populations affected by rising food prices. In September 2010, for instance, as several 
rural Mozambican communities were affected by large-scale land leases, largely for the 
production of feedstocks for biodiesel and bio-ethanol, urban food riots in response to price 
rises led to several deaths. While the urban mobilisation was explicitly directed towards the 
Frelimo-led government, rural resistance, where this has emerged, has tended to focus on 
local-level leaders who are considered to have acted as intermediaries to facilitate the 
conclusion of land leases, and the external investors themselves.  
The increasing pressures on land will invariably increase tensions between the various 
communities and among the individuals within these communities. The conflicts could pit 
various communities against each other, e.g. migrant workers versus the local populations, 
displaced persons versus those whose land rights have been relatively untouched by the land 
transfers, and the various responses that people invoke to cope with the pressures could be 
sources of friction between the various stakeholders. Although some of the impact will become 
apparent in the longer term, there is a dearth of information on the exact dynamics at the local 
level. There are, however, various initiatives that aim to fill this gap, including the LVC 
conference and research being undertaken by the ILC, FIAN and Oakland Institute. The 
examples highlighted in this section illustrate the diversity of movements, and the scale, 
direction and geographical impact of social responses to the commercial pressures on land. 
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They demonstrate the varied fora within which responses are articulated, which include legal 
and extra-legal fora, the media, formal and informal engagements, state and non-state actors, 
and invented and invited spaces. Although responses can be short term, localised and focused 
the experiences of the Enderois and LVC show that engagement can be long term, 
intergenerational and span geographical divides. The experiences of the Enderois community 
and the Sudanese who halted a land deal illustrate the potential to re-visit, cancel and 
overturn signed and sealed land contracts. Whether this will catalyse the formation of 
sustainable social movement on the continent remains to be seen. 
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5 Ways to mitigate conflict, social and political 
unrest 
Although developing countries could use the investment that comes with large-scale 
transactions in land to improve their economies, the manner in which this is currently done is 
potentially explosive. This is precipitated by the poor governance practices involved in these 
transactions, which are largely conducted in secret and to the exclusion of communities who 
may stand to benefit but also to bear the brunt of the transactions. The localised eruptions of 
violent protest and resistance could potentially lead to mobilisation at the national and regional 
levels and foment social and political unrest. The experience of Madagascar, where a head of 
state was deposed on the back of a deeply unpopular land transaction, suggests that this is a 
real and tangible possibility.  
5.1 Legal and policy frameworks governing land 
Consensus is emerging among a wide range of actors of the need to regulate large-scale land 
deals in Africa, and to draw lessons on best (or at least better) practices from the continent, or 
elsewhere. Core to such initiatives will be the strengthening of land rights in law and policy at 
the national level. The African Union’s Framework and Guidelines on Land Policy (African 
Union, 2009) offers an important starting point for such reforms, but does not prescribe how 
national governments should interpret the guidelines. Indeed, it appears that, since their 
adoption in 2009, there has been little if any progress in putting them into practice. The 
priority now must be on regional initiatives to take forward this Framework, through regional 
economic commissions down to the level of national governments. The substance of the 
agenda must be to secure the existing rights of legitimate landholders and users – in law and 
practice – in ways that can enable people either to leverage preferential terms in any 
transaction with outsiders, or to resist new claims on their land.  
Based on experiences with land law reforms and implementation, priority principles to guide 
legal and policy reforms include: 
1. Legal reform: give statutory recognition of de facto rights (i.e. existing occupation and 
use) in law – including overlapping rights. 
2. Registration: develop mechanisms for low-cost registration and verification as a basis for 
transacting rights (e.g. local land rental markets). 
3. Decentralisation: decentralise administration of land rights to local government 
authorities (with representation of traditional leaders, where these exist). 
4. Land taxes: introduce taxes on leased properties to discourage speculative land 
acquisitions. 
5. Consultations: Specify in law the procedural requirements for consultation between 
investors and affected communities, as well as guidelines regarding minimum forms and 
levels of compensation. 
5.2 Procedural better practice: partnerships and negotiations regarding land-
based investment 
Land-tenure reforms are a precondition but insufficient to protect local landholders from 
exclusion in processes of land-based investments. For this reason, and in order to mitigate the 
potential conflict and defuse existing simmering anger among those affected who feel they 
have been treated unfairly, improved procedures are needed to guide, even regulate, the 
allocation and acquisition of land to investors. This is particularly important for indigenous 
communities, in view of the discrimination and marginalisation to which they have historically 
been subjected (de Schutter, 2011). The principle already enshrined in international law of 
‘free prior and informed consent’ (FPIC) potentially offers a way to obtain community consent 
in large-scale land investments. In instances where land deals have already been signed, these 
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should be revisited with a view to facilitating ‘meaningful company–community engagement, in 
which host communities influence investment design and participate in on-going processes of 
shared decision-making’ (Deng, 2011b: 6). Based on experiences from cases documented 
across the region, five recommendations for improving the procedural dimensions of any 
negotiations regarding land transactions in this context are:  
1. Consent: specify the FPIC principle among local and affected communities as a standard 
required before any land lease is concluded. 
2. Prioritisation: give preference to those forms of investment that avoid the displacement 
of existing populations, and disruption of existing land rights; invest in small farmers, 
rather than engaging in land transactions.  
3. Participation: broaden participation in land deals to include communities and CSOs, to 
enable fuller representation and improved transparency.  
4. Proactive: promote coalitions of states, communities and CSOs, e.g. ESIA interventions 
to enable them to shape rather than be mere recipients of investor-led land-deal 
proposals. 
5. Direct transactions: revisit the role of the state in land deals; in many cases, the state 
should not be the lessor of customary lands, or even a signatory to the deal, but remain 
outside as a mediator and guarantor of transactions between rights-holders and 
investors. 
5.3 Substantive better practice: structures and designs of inclusive business 
models 
While there are strong calls for an end to large-scale land leasing in developing countries 
(FIAN, 2011; LVC, 2008), given the priority placed by African governments on attracting 
external agricultural investment, it is likely that the trend will continue. The question then is of 
what forms of investment will happen, how it will be governed and regulated, and whether the 
widespread abuses already documented (and highlighted in this paper) can be stopped, while 
allowing different, and better, forms of investment to proceed. But what are the better forms 
of investment? Substantial research and policy debate is now emerging about ‘inclusive 
business models’ that can involve meaningful benefit-sharing between local communities and 
investors (IIED, 2011).  
In addition, legal research on the terms of land deals (Howard and Smaller, 2009; IIED, 2010) 
is now showing that the terms of contracts are often poorly conceived, poorly drafted, and limit 
government capacity to make future policy in the interests of their citizens. In addition, a 
range of other forms of regulation – from domestic law, to bilateral investment treaties, to 
international law – also govern these transnational investments. These multiple levels of law 
intersect with a wide spectrum of actors. Highly caricatured notions abound about how land 
deals are included, who the actors are, and how they interact (or could do so). While several 
initiatives envisage three central actors that are party to negotiations for land leases – state, 
community and investor – this is seldom the case (see Figure 5.1 below). 
Figure 5.1 Contracting in large-scale land deals: caricatured assumption about actors 
 
Source: the authors 
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Hall (2011) shows that, in many cases in Southern Africa, the lessee is not the investor; 
rather, there are onward transactions of land leases to third parties. Similarly, the leasing 
authority (often the state) is often not locally recognised as the rights-holder (Alden Wiley, 
2011). Further, the terms of the deals are substantially determined by financiers and other 
parties who might have no operational role in the project itself. The emerging evidence on the 
parties to land deals in Africa suggests that the reality is far more complex than is suggested 
by this triumvirate of state–community–investor. In other words, rather than Figure 5.1 above, 
case studies suggest that parties and contractual relationships in land deals rather resemble 
Figure 5.2. 
Figure 5.2 Contracting in large-scale land deals: typical range of actors and deals 
 
Source: authors’ own, based in part on IIED (2010) 
This more messy set of practices is significant for policy-makers seeking effective measures for 
regulation: land leasing embodies many different legal frameworks, from the national to the 
international, as well as a range of other norms and standards, including those promoted by 
the private sector. These have very different weight in law and in practice.  
Better practices and innovations in the terms of contracts 
In this context, there is a need to acknowledge the array of actors, while also using the 
primary land-lease contract as the means by which to set standards that must be adhered to – 
regardless of the multiple parties to the project. Specific examples of better practices emerging 
from the literature include: 
1. No carte blanche: conclude contracts only for short durations that are renewable subject 
to achievement of specified milestones of investment and benefit-sharing. 
2. Specification: include very specific definitions of the land and other resources that are 
being allocated, including water, and valuation of these resources. 
3. Flexibility: provide for re-negotiation over time of contracts, including rental payments 
and the level of other forms of compensation. 
4. Sovereignty: explicitly subordinate entitlements of investors to national law and 
development priorities (including food supply, water availability, environmental and 
social protection); restrict the right to export in contexts of food shortages, and avoid 
‘stabilisation clauses’ in lease contracts. 
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5. Transparency: establish norms requiring publication of contracts and ratification by 
national parliaments (as is the case in Liberia). 
Better practices and innovations in benefit sharing and compensation 
Inclusive business arrangements include direct rental payments being made to affected 
communities, preferential terms for employment of local people, shareholding partnerships, 
and supply-chain partnerships, such as out-grower schemes or contract farming. However, the 
widespread hope that the latter type of partnerships can produce ‘win-win’ solutions for 
investors and local people alike (von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009; IIED 2009) seems 
ahistorical in the light of experience with contract farming in commercial agriculture in sub-
Saharan Africa (Little and Watts, 1994). Yet the poor track record in this area could give way 
to improved practices, particularly if the terms of deals between investors and local 
communities can be structured to involve meaningful partnerships for joint production and 
development, with guarantees regarding benefit-sharing, or substantial compensation for local 
people. Specific examples of better practices emerging from the literature include: 
1. Shareholding: avoid reliance on dividends as the only form of benefit for local 
communities – ensure some benefit as a percentage of turnover rather than declared 
profit, to address limited community control over (re)-investment decisions and the 
potential for ‘transfer pricing’. 
2. Subsidiarity: funds and inclusion in decisions taken at the most local level through 
community and governance structures. 
3. Temporal equity: in the interests of future generations, avoid simple lump-sum payouts 
in the short term, as grievances will be likely to re-emerge; not just in relation to the 
next generation but also growing population pressure on finite resources. 
4. Jobs and infrastructure: specify enforceable commitments (including qualitative as well 
as quantitative indicators) and accompanying sanctions for non-compliance in contracts; 
provide for phased transfer of ownership, for instance through skills transfer. 
5. Multiple land uses: provide for local uses/users for food production and livelihood 
purposes, alongside commercial production by investor. The aim must be to look for 
complementarities including in input supply and value adding – rather than limiting 
locals to primary production. 
 
Self-regulation by the private sector  
It is worth bearing in mind that international investors – especially large transnational 
corporations (TNCs) – are highly susceptible to reputational risk, and may be responsive to 
negative publicity, and willing to amend the terms of their investments, and improve the 
nature of partnerships with local people. Private-sector initiatives, such as those initiated by 
the Roundtable on Soy, the Roundtable on Palm Oil, and the emerging Sustainable Biofuels 
Initiative, have attempted to establish norms to guide the expansion of this industry, and 
similar initiatives abound in other sectors, including the Equator Principles guiding financial 
institutions, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the Better Sugar 
Initiative. Finding ways to monitor industry codes, and to build bridges between multilateral 
and government regulations, and private-sector voluntary regulation, will be important.
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Conclusions 
Tenure security contributes to economic development in both direct and indirect ways. Given 
the diverse experiences with legal, policy and institutional reforms enacted across the 
continent, thinking about best practices has evolved far beyond the ‘titling’ approaches of the 
1970s and 1980s. Securing tenure requires legal reforms to recognise occupation, accessible 
and decentralised systems of land administration, and investing in institutions performing land-
administration functions. It does not require (and indeed can be undermined by) private titling 
of customary lands, central government registration, and the devolution of all land 
administration to traditional leaders.  
Rising investor interest in African farmland – in a context of concerns about global food supply 
in the long term, fuel security in the medium term, and profits from financial investments in 
the short term – the forms that these land deals are taking is diverse, and no simple or 
formulaic solutions should be imposed. There are certain principles, norms and standards, 
however, which could assist in strengthening land laws and policies; procedural requirements 
for any land-based investments; and substantive requirements and better practices that can 
promote more inclusive forms of development that mitigate the risks of conflict and promote 
development agendas of poverty reduction, while also promoting more intensive use of land to 
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